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the paper challenges claims that the implementation of tobacco control policies can 
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that this approach needs to be supplemented by an ideational understanding of 
policy-change which pays attention to the ways in which arguments and evidence 
are constructed and framed. The paper also suggests there are signs the two, 
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Introduction 
From New Labour’s commitments to evidence-based policy (Cabinet Office 1999) to 
current efforts to promote research ‘impact’, the past 15 years have witnessed a 
growing belief that research should inform UK policy decisions. Within public health, 
this emphasis has been reinforced by links to evidence-based medicine and support 
from the World Health Organization (1998).  Numerous studies now explore the 
relationship between research and policy in this field (e.g. Exworthy et al. 2003; 
Whitehead et al. 2004; Smith 2007) but, despite all this activity, most studies 
conclude that research evidence has played a limited role in health policy, or at least 
more limited than official commitments to ‘evidence-based policy’ implied (e.g. 
Capability Reviews Team 2007; Exworthy et al. 2003; Smith 2007). 
 
One area of public health policy which is sometimes depicted as confounding this 
trend, at least in recent times, is tobacco control (Whitehead et al. 2004; Warner and 
Mendez 2010).  Evidence concerning the health damaging consequences of tobacco 
first emerged in 1947 (see Berridge 2006; 2007) and, as evidence began to 
accumulate, calls for policy interventions grew louder (Berridge 2006; 2007).  In the 
UK, Action on Smoking and Health (ASH) was established in 1971 (Berridge and 
Loughlin 2005) and subsequently played a high-profile part in advocacy efforts to 
encourage policy interventions to address what came to be known as the ‘tobacco 
epidemic’ (Lopez et al. 1994).  A series of UK policy efforts to reduce tobacco use 
and/or the harms associated with smoking ensued, including health warnings on 
packs, restrictions, then bans, on tobacco advertising and, more recently, bans on 
smoking in indoor public places (Cairney 2007). By 2012, the UK was identified as 
having the most advanced tobacco control policies in Europe (Joossens and Raw 
2011) with further interventions being implemented (e.g. product display 
restrictions) and considered (e.g. standardised, ‘plain’ packaging). 
 
All this has been achieved despite the well-resourced efforts of the tobacco industry 
(Cairney 2007).  Understandably, therefore, for many in public health tobacco 
control represents an example of the potentially positive influence of public health 
evidence (Whitehead et al. 2004; Warner and Mendez 2010; Proctor 2012). As such, 
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tobacco is increasingly being positioned as a case study from which other areas of 
public policy, including food and alcohol, might learn (e.g. Freudenberg 2005; 
Brownell and Warner 2009). 
 
This paper builds on a small but growing number of studies that have sought to 
employ theoretical frameworks concerning policy change to illuminate deeper and 
more complex aspects of the ‘tobacco wars’ (e.g. Farquharson 2003; Berridge 2006; 
Breton et al. 2006; Givel 2006; Cairney 2007; Princen 2007; Larsen 2008; Young et al. 
2012).  It differs from most others by focusing specifically on the role of evidence 
and ideas in the decade-long debates about tobacco.  It begins by assessing claims 
that tobacco control represents a (rare) example of evidence-based public health 
policy, before moving on to consider three further potential frameworks, each of 
which provides additional insights.  It draws largely on following sources (though 
additional texts are referred to in relation to specific points): (i) historical overviews 
of the ‘tobacco wars’, notably a series of UK-focused publications by the public 
health historian, Virginia Berridge (1999; 2003; 2006; 2007; Berridge and Loughlin 
2005); (ii) a 2012 twentieth anniversary edition of the journal Tobacco Control; and 
(iii) a systematic review of evidence relating to tobacco industry strategies to 
influence tobacco tax policies (Smith et al. 2012), the most effective policy lever for 
reducing tobacco consumption (IARC, 2011).  The concluding discussion briefly 
summarises the analysis and considers what insights this case study offers those 
interested in studying or improving the role of evidence in policy more broadly. 
 
Four ways of understanding the UK’s ‘tobacco wars’ 
(i) Rational evidence-focused approaches 
Starting with the simplest approach, tobacco-related research might be understood 
as a rare example of a ‘knowledge-driven model’ of the relationship between 
research and policy, in which knowledge (derived from scientific research) helped 
identify a significant problem (the health harms caused by tobacco, first to smokers 
themselves and, more recently, to passive smokers) and then helped policymakers 
decide how to respond (see Weiss 1979 for a more detailed account of this way of 
conceiving the relationship between research and policy).  One immediately obvious 
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flaw with this approach is, as Larsen (2008) highlights, the failure to account for the 
significant delay between official recognition of the health harms associated with 
tobacco use and passive smoking (see Berridge 1999; 2006) and the policy 
interventions intended to reduce these harms.  Some tobacco control interventions 
were, of course, put in place in the 1960s-1980s but, aside from tax increases, they 
were often voluntary and as Cairney (2007) argues, in legislative terms, UK tobacco 
policy has been characterised by periods of significant stability, followed by rapid 
change, notably from the mid-1990s onwards. Comprehensive bans on tobacco 
advertising, for example, were only implemented in the UK in 2002 (Neuman et al. 
2002) and bans on smoking in indoor public places were only introduced between 
2004 and 2006 (Cairney 2007).  To understand why there was such a long delay 
between the emergence of evidence about the health harms of tobacco and 
significant policy intervention to reduce those harms, other accounts of policymaking 
and the potential role of evidence within this, are therefore required. 
 
One potential explanation comes from Caplan’s (1979) thesis that ‘cultural’ and 
institutional divides separate researchers and policymakers, limiting the accessibility 
of evidence within policy.  Many contemporary assessments certainly support the 
idea that communicative and institutional ‘gaps’ between researchers and 
policymakers plague public health (e.g. Hunter 2009).  Yet, in examining British 
tobacco debates in the 1950s and 1960s, Berridge (Berridge and Loughlin 2005; 
Berridge 2006) claims policymakers largely understood the main messages of 
research on the health-harms of tobacco and that resistance to taking policy action 
was only partly related to their assessment of this evidence.  Indeed, Berridge points 
out that fundamental disagreements about tobacco existed within both the research 
and the policy communities at this time.  For example, Ronald Fisher, a statistician 
who played a key role in developing randomised-controlled trial methodologies, was 
critical of researchers’ call for action to discourage smoking, in part because he felt 
that correlation should not be taken as causation but also, Berridge (2006) argues, 
because policies to restrict smoking conflicted with his own libertarian views.  
Meanwhile, Berridge (2006) notes that divergent views about the need for policy 
action on tobacco were evident within both of the UK’s main political parties, which 
Accepted for publication in Social Policy & Administration 2013 
she argues reflected differences in personal values, family backgrounds and election 
strategies as much as interpretations of the available evidence.  Overall, focusing on 
differences between ‘policymakers’ and ‘researchers’ does not seem particularly 
helpful in explaining the delayed policy response to research concerning the harmful 
effects of smoking, unhelpfully sidelining the role of actors’ values and judgements 
(Cairney, 2007; McQueen 2010).  It also obscures the potentially important role of 
actors who do not fit neatly into the two ‘communities’ of ‘researchers’ and 
‘policymakers’ (e.g. journalists, corporate lobbyists, health advocacy groups and 
government researchers). 
 
Another possible explanation could be policy resistance to change.  Historical 
institutionalism, for example, posits that policy tends to be resistance to change and 
that policy outcomes can only be understood by considering the historical and 
institutional context in which decisions are made (Béland 2005; Schmidt 2010).  For 
example, to understand UK decisions about tobacco taxation it is necessary to 
acknowledge that the Treasury (not the Department of Health) has primary 
responsibility, meaning the issue tends to be viewed through a revenue, rather than 
health, focused lens.   A recent international review of evidence suggest tobacco tax 
increases usually lead to increased government revenue (IARC, 2011) but such 
evidence is relatively recent and the tobacco industry has regularly argued that tax 
increases reduce revenue (Smith et al. 2012).  Back in the 1950s, Berridge (2006) 
notes that the Treasury’s focus on tobacco tax revenue prompted significant anxiety 
about measures to reduce tobacco.  Attending to the institutional context in which 
evidence is interpreted and policy decisions reached certainly seems important.  
However, because historical institutionalism struggles to explain policy change 
(Schmidt 2010), it does liitle to help explain why tobacco tax increases were 
subsequently employed in the 1970s (Cairney, 2007).  
 
In sum, it does not seem easy to explain the significant time lag between the 
emergence of evidence about the harms caused by tobacco and subsequent policy 
interventions.  A further fundamental problem with rational, linear conceptions of 
the relationship between evidence and policy in the ‘tobacco wars’ is that they do 
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not distinguish between the multiple different kinds of evidence that might play a 
role in policy change.  Yet much of the early (epidemiological and medical) evidence 
about the health harms of tobacco provided policymakers with little, if any, guidance 
as to what they might do to tackle this problem, let alone what might be most 
effective (or cost-effective) in a UK context.  In other words, much of the evidence 
required to achieve ‘evidence-based’ policies (see Killoran and Kelly, 2010) has 
emerged only recently (and gaps in the evidence-base remain).  Furthermore, as 
Chapman (2007) acknowledges, some of the most recent ‘advances’ in tobacco 
control, such as bans on smoking in public places, initially went beyond the available 
evidence (though evidence supporting these policies did subsequently emerge - e.g. 
Sims et al. 2012).  Research alone, Weiss notes, is almost never ‘comprehensive 
enough to be the sole source of policy advice’ (Weiss 1990: 98). 
 
This is an important point both descriptively and when considering the potential 
lessons that the ‘tobacco wars’ offers those interested in improving the use of 
evidence in policy.  Public health researchers have often been strong advocates of 
the need for policy to be evidence-based (e.g. Macintyre, 2011). Yet tobacco industry 
arguments against new tobacco control proposals often focus on the limits of the 
evidence.  This is evident, for example, in recent tobacco company challenges to 
proposals for plain (unbranded) cigarette packs in Australia and the UK (see Jones 
2012). Indeed, the world’s largest two transnational tobacco companies have both 
been involved in campaigns for promoting the need for policies to be based on 
‘sound science’, risk assessments and cost-benefit analyses, with the intention of 
using limitations in the available evidence to prevent (or at least delay) public health 
policies (e.g. Ong and Glantz 2001; Smith et al. 2010).  In other words, an overly 
strong emphasis on the evidence in policy may unintentionally constrain public 
health policy innovation.  
 
Overall, then, whilst evidence has clearly played an important role in promoting the 
need for tobacco control policies, it seems difficult to conclude that the ‘tobacco 
wars’ represent an example of a rational, linear relationship between evidence and 
policy.  At best, the UK’s recent strong performance in tobacco control ‘league 
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tables’ (Joossens and Raw 2011) reflects decisions by the UK and devolved 
governments to pursue policy interventions which, in the context of varying levels 
and types of evidence, have attained sufficient policy support.   
 
(ii) Value-orientated approaches (including the ‘Advocacy Coalition Framework’) 
Other authors have employed value-orientated approaches to studying the ‘tobacco 
wars’ (Farquharson 2003; Princen 2007).  Most simply, some authors employ what 
Berridge (2006) has termed a ‘heroes and villains’ framework, depicting tobacco 
control advocates as David-like heroes who have achieved successes in some 
countries despite the Goliath-like tobacco industry’s vast resources and willingness 
to employ devious and deceitful tactics.  This kind of narrative is, for example, 
evident in some of the overviews presented in the anniversary issue of Tobacco 
Control (e.g. Proctor 2012). It is a potentially seductive framing which has a great 
deal in common with the notion that the ‘tobacco wars’ represent the ultimate 
victory of public health evidence over corporate interests, though it emphasises 
public health values as much as evidence. 
 
A somewhat more sophisticated, value-focused approach to understanding the 
‘tobacco wars’ is provided in accounts employing Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s (1993; 
1999) ‘advocacy coalition framework’ (ACF) (e.g. Farquharson 2003; Givel 2006; 
Princen 2007).  The ACF posits that networks of diverse actors (potentially including 
policymakers, researchers, think tanks, journalists, interest groups and others) 
compete to influence policy for particular issues (or ‘policy subsystems’, to use the 
language of ACF).  It suggests that these competing networks tend to remain 
relatively stable because they form around ‘policy core’ beliefs which, in turn, reflect 
‘deep core’ beliefs (deeply held ontological and normative beliefs).  For example, a 
beliefs concerning the balance between individuals’ right to freedom versus social 
equality represent ‘deep core’ beliefs.  These inform ‘policy core’ beliefs which, for 
include, for example, beliefs about the appropriate division of authority between 
governments and markets. Finally, secondary policy beliefs concern beliefs about the 
optimum policy instruments to achieve agreed policy goals (e.g. whether to employ 
targets for smoking cessation).  Changes in ‘deep core’ beliefs are extremely rare, 
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being ‘akin to religious conversion’, whilst changes in ‘policy core beliefs’ are 
deemed only marginally more likely.  In other words, the ACF foregrounds the 
importance of shared ways of viewing the world (over political and economic 
interests or evidence). When particular advocacy coalitions dominate, it is 
anticipated that policies will reflect their core beliefs and will remain stable.  
However, significant policy change may occur when a competing advocacy coalition’s 
ideas are perceived to be so successful that some actors switch coalitions, shifting 
the balance of power in relation to the ‘core ideas’ driving policy.  From this 
perspective, evidence is only likely to influence policy if it fits with the core beliefs of 
the dominant coalition. 
 
The tobacco policy subsystem could be interpreted as being dominated by two clear 
advocacy coalitions: (1) proponents of stricter tobacco control measures (e.g. public 
health researchers, health advocacy groups and health policymakers); and (2) 
opponents of stricter tobacco control measures (e.g. tobacco industry and related 
interests, smokers rights’ groups and policymakers responsible for business and 
trade interests). The ACF has already been successfully applied to international 
tobacco control policy development (Farquharson 2003; Princen 2007), as well as to 
tobacco tax debates in Canada and the US (Breton et al. 2006; Givel 2006).  However, 
as Cairney (2007) points out, the ACF tends to attribute policy change of any 
magnitude to external shocks and has little to say about how or why coalitions lose 
or gain dominance over time or to the potential role of evidence within this.  
 
This might be partly because in emphasising the importance of core and policy 
beliefs, the ACF assumes a relatively high degree of coherence exists within opposing 
coalitions. In reality, tobacco debates in the UK have often been informed by 
temporary alliances between actors whose interests and/or beliefs overlapped for 
specific policy proposals (Cairney, 2007).  Indeed, as Figure 1 outlines, the coalition 
supporting tobacco control interventions might be better understood as a 
convergence of overlapping principles and interests.   
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Figure 1: The potentially divergent beliefs within coalitions favouring stronger 
tobacco control 
 
 
For many tobacco control interventions, including restrictions on marketing and bans 
on smoking in public places, the interests and beliefs outlined in Figure 1 overlap 
sufficiently for these groups to be conceptualised as a unified coalition.  At times, the 
existence of different interests within the coalition may benefit tobacco control (e.g. 
by enabling tobacco control measures to be promoted as means of reducing health 
inequalities, as discussed further in section (iv)).  However, for other tobacco control 
policies, this apparently cohesive coalition begins to unravel. For example, whilst 
tobacco control advocates widely support efforts to denormalise smoking, a leading 
health inequalities researcher has raised concerns about the negative impacts that 
stigmatisation can have on poorer communities (e.g. Graham, 2012). 
 
   
 
1. Tobacco control 
measures are required to 
tackle major non-
communicable diseases, 
such as lung cancer 
Actors likely to share/articulate this belief: health interest groups, researchers and 
policymakers focusing on non-communicable diseases; some victims of smoking-related 
morbidity and/or families of smokers who have died as a result of their smoking 
pharmaceutical companies selling nicotine-replacement products; insurance companies. 
2. Tobacco control 
measures are 
required because 
smoking is strongly 
associated with 
health inequalities 
3. Tobacco control 
measures are required 
because tobacco is an 
addictive drug, 
promoted by 
corporations, that kills 
Actors likely to share/articulate  this 
belief: some victims of smoking-related 
morbidity and/or families of smokers 
who have died as a result of their 
smoking; some health interest groups 
and some public health researchers 
Actors likely to share/articulate this 
belief: researchers and policymakers 
concerned with politically feasible means 
of reducing health inequalities; 
pharmaceutical companies selling 
nicotine-replacement products 
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Proposals to further increase tobacco taxes (which are already high in the UK) are 
another example of the differences depicted within Figure 1.  Poorer groups are 
more price sensitive and therefore more likely to quit, or reduce their consumption, 
as a result of tax-induced price increases, which is why IARC (2011) argues that 
tobacco tax increases help reduce inequalities in smoking.  However, tobacco is an 
addictive habit usually taken up in childhood (Advisory Group of the Royal College of 
Physicians 2000) which means, even though most smokers want to quit (Robinson 
and Bugler 2008), many will be unable to and poorer smokers can find it particularly 
difficult to quit (Stead et al. 2001).  Hence, despite price increases, some poor 
smokers will continue to smoke and those who do will spend more of their (relatively 
lower) incomes on tobacco, leaving less available for other important living costs.  
This is why, in direct contrast to the IARC review, a UK government-commissioned 
review of approaches to health inequalities (led by health inequalities academics) 
judged further tobacco tax increases should not be supported (Marmot 2010).  Such 
a contrast highlights the importance of interpretation and judgement in assessing 
the policy implications of evidence (Cairney, 2007; McQueen 2010). 
  
Proposals for harm reduction are yet another example of some of the divisions 
depicted in Figure 1, though this time the differences are primarily between groups 1 
and 3. For actors primarily concerned with reducing the health impacts of non-
communicable diseases, harm-reduction measures such as legalising  ‘snus’ (a form 
of oral tobacco generally deemed less harmful than cigarettes) seems ‘a promising 
public health policy’ (Gartner et al. 2007).  The same is true of long-term nicotine 
replacement therapy, which is strongly supported by pharmaceutical interests (e.g. 
Pfizer Ltd 2008).  Yet, from the perspective of actors concerned with the health 
threats posed by business interests marketing addictive products, such harm 
reduction approaches can seem ‘heretical’ (Gartner et al. 2007).  In addition, 
conflicting beliefs exist about whether harm reduction approaches complement or 
compromise risk elimination strategies (Gartner et al. 2007). 
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Differences are also evident in the coalition representing tobacco interests.  This is 
perhaps most obvious with regards tobacco taxation and pricing, which are 
becoming increasingly important issues for tobacco companies in the UK (Gilmore 
2012).  For example, whilst virtually all tobacco interests tend prefer low tobacco 
taxes, and often lobby collectively on this issue (Smith et al. 2012), evidence suggests 
transnational tobacco companies may support tax increases if, for example, they 
believe this will help them achieve changes to tax structures which competitively 
favour their brands (Shirane et al. 2012).  Indeed, when it comes to tax structures 
the interests of the world’s largest transnational tobacco company, Philip Morris, 
may have more in common with tobacco control advocates than with other tobacco 
companies, as both favour ‘specific’ taxation (IARC 2011; Smith et al. 2012).  
‘Specific’ taxes involve a set monetary value being uniformly applied to packs of 
cigarettes (regardless of pack price), whereas ‘ad valorem’ taxes are calculated as a 
percentage of product price (meaning a higher tax applies to more expensive 
cigarettes).  The former therefore function to reduce price differences between 
cheaper and more expensive brands, to the benefit of Philip Morris’ more expensive 
brand portfolio and to tobacco control advocates concerned about the potential for 
smokers to ‘down-trade’. 
 
These are merely illustrative examples of some of the complexities involved in 
debates about tobacco-related policies and interventions but they serve to highlight 
the limitations of approaches which frame tobacco control as a battle between two, 
clearly opposed coalitions formed around coherent values.  Even Figure 1 is a 
simplified depiction of the variety of beliefs and interests that have been involved in 
promoting and resisting various tobacco control proposals.  Hence, whilst value-
based, network approaches provide a better means of understanding the ‘tobacco 
wars’ than rational, evidence-based frames, they do not necessarily do enough to 
explain the varying interests and beliefs of actors within coalitions.  This is important 
both because it is impacts on actors’ interpretations of the policy consequences of 
the available evidence and because it is likely to inform the varying fortunes of 
coalitions over time.   
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(iii) Broader, network-based approaches (including Actor-Network Theory) 
One of the particularly useful features of the ACF is its attention to diverse groups of 
actors and this is also a feature of the broader literature on ‘policy networks’, which 
ranges from ‘iron triangles’ involving stable relationships between politicians, 
interest groups and career civil servants (Overman and Don 1986) to larger, more 
fluid ‘issue networks’ (Heclo 1978).  Marsh and Rhodes (1992) suggest that particular 
policy issues tend to be characterised by the existence of either an ‘issue network’ or 
a ‘policy community’.  However, Read (1992) argues that, during the 1980s, tobacco 
in the UK was characterised by the simultaneous existence of an ‘issue network’ 
(consisting of tobacco industry representatives and tobacco control lobbyists) and a 
‘policy community’ (consisting of policymakers and tobacco interests but excluding 
tobacco control advocates).  This highlights the potential limitations of focusing on 
particular kinds of policy networks and, given the breadth of the literature, this 
perhaps limits the utility of the concept.  Moreover, like the ACF, the ‘policy 
networks’ literature generally offers few insights into the potential role of evidence 
and ideas in achieving policy change. 
 
Alternative network-based approaches, developed in science studies, have also 
recently been applied to analysing tobacco debates (Young et al. 2012).  Such 
theories, notably Actor-Network Theory (ANT), emphasise the importance of 
studying the processes involved in undertaking research and constructing, as well as 
disseminating, knowledge claims (Knorr-Cetina 1981; Latour and Woolgar 1986).   
ANT also places significant emphasis on the translation (as opposed to the transfer) 
of knowledge-claims (Latour 2005), encouraging analysts to trace how ideas change 
as they move between actors.  It posits that the appearance of some actors as 
singular, discrete bodies (e.g. ‘the government’, ‘the public health community’ or 
‘the tobacco industry’) is actually the effect of diverse underlying networks of actors 
which only become visible when they fail or when they are carefully uncovered 
through detailed anthropological observations (Latour 2005). Perhaps the most 
radical aspect of ANT is that the term ‘actor’ is extended to include non-humans, 
such as documents and technologies.  As such, ANT usefully calls attention to the 
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construction and enrolment of evidence within tobacco debates, although in 
contrast to the ACF, it has little to say about the role of ethics or values. 
 
Moreover, an assumption within ANT that the ‘macro’ is actually no different from 
the ‘micro’ (Law 1992)has led to criticisms that ANT may be politically disabling and 
uncritical, focusing analysts’ attention on  ‘how’ networks form and are performed, 
at the expense of considering why these networks are being produced and 
maintained (Bakker and Bridge 2006).  This criticism is compounded by the fact that 
ANT is often promoted as a methodological approach requiring detailed 
anthropological research (Latour 2005) which tends, implicitly, to restrict the focus 
of research to small networks (or small parts of larger networks).  This limits the 
possibility of applying ANT to an assessment of the UK’s ‘tobacco wars’.  
 
(iv) Ideational and ‘enlightenment’ approaches 
An increasing acknowledgement of the complexity involved in evidence-translation 
(e.g. Sanderson 2006; Smith and Joyce 2012) has led some analysts to focus on ideas 
(rather than evidence) as the entity that moves between research and policy (Smith 
2007), or across geographical locations (Stone 2004). Mirroring this shift, there has 
been a burgeoning interest in ideas within theories of policy change (Béland 2005; 
Schmidt 2010).  Focusing on ‘ideas’ not only acknowledges the potential for 
translation, rather than transfer, thereby incorporating a key aspect of ANT, it can 
also be used to capture some of the interactions between politics, ethics, values and 
evidence (Sanderson 2006). However, the concept of ‘ideas’ is poorly defined (Blyth 
1997), having been used to refer to ideologies, frames, norms, ‘paradigms’, 
explanatory theories and specific policy proposals.  Further, because ideas ‘do not 
leave much of a trail when they shift’ (Hall 1993), it can be difficult to assess whether 
what appears to be the translation of a particular idea is merely another idea with 
similar characteristics (Smith 2007).  Nevertheless, focusing on ideas helps 
emphasise that even evidence-informed messages can be continually translated as 
they become intertwined with politics, ethics and values (Sanderson 2006; Smith and 
Joyce 2012). 
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An analysis of the ‘tobacco wars’ focusing on ideologies might look very similar to 
the value-based approaches considered in the previous section.  Alternatively, 
employing Weiss’ (1977) ‘enlightenment model’ of the function of research draws 
attention to the potential influence of research-inspired ideas.  Such ideas may 
involve specific policy proposals but also, as Weiss argues, may influence policy via a 
process of gradual diffusion that leads to changes in the way the public and policy 
actors think about particular issues. Berridge (2006) has already applied this 
‘enlightenment’ approach to historical tobacco control debates.  It potentially helps 
explain why evidence about the health harms of tobacco took so long to trigger any 
significant policy action and why, once public and policy perceptions had shifted, 
multiple policy developments were enabled, including those for which evidence was 
limited.  For, once ministers were assured of sufficient public support for tobacco 
control, interventions to restrict tobacco use would have appeared far more viable 
(see Cairney 2007 for the importance of policy perceptions of public opinion about 
tobacco policy interventions).  
 
However, it does not seem sufficient to attribute shifts in public and policy opinion 
to the gradual diffusion of evidence about the health harms of tobacco without also 
considering the evidence and ideas that tobacco interests constructed and employed 
in this period.  Here, the concept of ‘framing’, which represents another way of 
thinking about the role of ideas in policy, seems more useful.  This involves assessing 
the frames (or narratives) being used to portray particular issues (Scheufele and 
Tewksbury 2007). Policy frames can inform beliefs and ideas about particular issues, 
limiting how actors perceive potential policy options and, relatedly, informing the 
positions adopted by networks/coalitions. As such, they have been described as a 
‘weapon of advocacy’ (Weiss 1989).  Various authors have examined the ‘frames’ 
employed around specific tobacco-related policy developments (e.g. Larsen, 2010; 
Weishaar et al, 2012) but it has not (to our knowledge) been used to assess tobacco 
debates more broadly (i.e. to understand what role particular framing devices might 
have played in the conceptual shift in public and policy opinion described above).  
Doing so highlights some important changes in the way tobacco control advocates 
have framed their arguments over time. 
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Initially, tobacco control advocates tended to focus exclusively on evidence relating 
to the health harms of tobacco (i.e. employing a health-orientated frame).  In 
contrast, tobacco interests often employed economic and ‘free personal choice’ 
frames, helping to emphasise their economic contributions (e.g. through 
employment and revenue), whilst minimising suggestions that policy interventions 
were needed to protect health (Cairney 2007; Warner 2000).  Reflecting this, the 
policy audience for tobacco control advocates tended to be policymakers in the 
Department of Health whilst tobacco interests focused on the Treasury and the 
Department of Trade and Industry, both of which tended to wield more power than 
Health (Cairney 2007; Read, 1992).  However, from the late 1970s onwards, tobacco 
control advocates began to develop their own economic frame, which challenged 
the industry one.  This was an important development as an internal Philip Morris 
from 1978, outlining the basic premise of this shift, reflects: 
 
‘More industry antagonists are using an economic argument against 
cigarettes; i.e. cigarettes cause disease; disease requires treatment; major 
health coats are borne by the government; the taxpayers pay in the end. 
Thus, as health costs rise astronomically, the opposition becomes armed with 
more potent weapons. We must be prepared to counter this line of 
argument’ (Saligman, 1978) 
 
Despite industry efforts, tobacco control advocates did develop persuasive claims 
about the economic (healthcare-related) costs of smoking (Warner, 2000) and this 
played an important role in the US litigation cases brought against tobacco 
companies by various US states and health insurance companies (Warner et al. 
1999). A 1999 World Bank report, which concluded that tobacco was economically 
damaging to all but a handful of tobacco-dependent agricultural economies, 
reinforced the credibility of tobacco control’s economic frame.  This kind of framing 
is now frequently evident in UK tobacco control advocacy material (e.g. ASH 2011).  
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At least two additional changes to the ‘frames’ employed in tobacco debates deserve 
consideration.  First, as Cairney (2007) points out, growing evidence about the health 
harms caused by passive smoking enabled tobacco control advocates to challenge 
the industry’s framing of smoking as a matter of personal choice.  Second, more 
recently, tobacco control measures have been positioned as a means of reducing 
health inequalities (e.g. Gruer et al. 2009) as well as reducing smoking (despite the 
fact some health inequalities researchers dispute this, e.g. Scott-Samuel 2009). This 
is important in the post-1997 UK era because reducing health inequalities were a 
policy priority that both the Department of Health and the Treasury were signed up 
to (see Cairney 2007; Smith and Hellowell, 2012).  
 
Overall, a focus on ‘policy frames’ supplements value-orientated, network-based and 
conceptual accounts of the ‘tobacco wars’ in the UK.  It helps demonstrate how 
tobacco control advocates’ evidence and arguments shifted over time, in ways which 
appear to have helped attract greater policy and public support (or, in ACF terms, 
greater coalition support).  The ability of tobacco control advocates to develop an 
economic frame seems likely to have been particularly important as this effectively 
re-presented tobacco control as a ‘win-win’ scenario for a variety of policy interests. 
 
 
Concluding Discussion 
Like Larsen (2008) and Berridge (2006), this paper quickly concluded that rational, 
evidence-focused approaches are inadequate for understanding the fraught 
relationship between public health evidence about, and policy responses to, the UK’s 
‘tobacco epidemic’.  Such approaches leave key questions unanswered, notably why 
there was such a long delay between the emergence of evidence about tobacco 
related harms and significant policy action to reduce those harms.  Once the 
multitude of different types of evidence is delineated (e.g. evidence concerning the 
health harms of smoking, from evidence relating to the potential costs and benefits 
of particular interventions, to evidence concerning public opinion), and the 
importance of interpretation more widely acknowledged, focusing on the role of 
evidence in policy debates seems more useful.  However, policy commitments to 
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evidence-based policy in the UK (and, indeed, accounts within public health) have 
tended to ignore the diversity of evidence-types and the potential for differing policy 
interpretations, in favour of a simple, linear account in which evidence represents 
the basis of policy change.  The paper argues that such linear, rational depictions are 
not only descriptively inaccurate but that they can serve to restrict policy innovation.   
 
Building on Farquharson (2003) and others (e.g. Breton et al. 2006; Princen 2007), 
the paper went on to examine more value-orientated approaches to understanding 
the role of evidence in tobacco policy debates, notably Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s 
(1993; 1999) ACF.  Like Farquharson (2003), this paper argues that the ACF provides 
a more convincing means of understanding the ‘tobacco wars’ than evidence-
orientated accounts and, like Cairney (2007), it found the ACF’s emphasis on diverse 
policy actors was useful.  Indeed, the decision to employ the term ‘tobacco wars’ 
throughout the paper reflects the extent to which the ACF seems to descriptively 
reflect UK tobacco debates from the 1950s onwards.  However, the paper also 
argues that, on closer examination, neither of the opposing ‘coalitions’ is necessarily 
as unified as the ACF literature implies.  Indeed, recent debates about harm 
reduction within tobacco control seem so divisive (Gartner et al, 2007) that it could 
be argued the ‘tobacco control’ coalition is at risk of experiencing a ‘civil war’.  
Meanwhile, positions on tobacco taxation vary within both health and industry 
coalitions.  This highlights the extent to which apparently cohesive coalitions can 
unravel as policy proposals evolve, potentially limiting the utility of the ACF.  
Moreover, the ACF offers few insights into the role of evidence within policy debates 
and does not sufficiently explain how particular coalitions gain and lose support over 
time. 
 
Conscious of the need to maintain a focus on multiple kinds of actors, the paper 
briefly considered how other network-based approaches might aid analyses of the 
‘tobacco wars’.  It concluded that the literature on ‘policy networks’ was too diverse 
to be useful but that ANT helped draw attention to the potential fragility of networks 
and to the social construction of knowledge-claims (ideas, evidence and arguments).  
However, ANT’s concern with the ‘micro’ makes it difficult, if not impossible, to apply 
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to the decades-long, multi-sectoral ‘tobacco wars’.  Moreover, ANT says little about 
the values and beliefs that seemed so useful when employing the ACF as a 
theoretical framework.  
 
In the final section, the paper focused on ideational approaches (Béland 2005) to 
understanding the ‘tobacco wars’.  Specifically, it considered how conceptual 
changes may occur over time and how coalitions can develop and employ particular 
‘frames’ to help attract support.  This approach retained some of the sociological 
interest in the construction and translation of knowledge-claims evident in ANT, but 
better captured the role of values, interests, interpretation and advocacy in the 
translation of evidence.  All this suggests that ideas (rather than evidence) may be 
the more appropriate unit of analysis when studying the relationship between 
evidence and policy, which also reflects the broader public policy turn to ‘ideas’ 
(Blyth 1997; Béland 2005; Schmidt 2010). This seems to offer a particularly fruitful 
approach to thinking about the potential role of evidence in policy when combined 
with an analysis of relevant networks, such as that offered by the ACF.  
 
Although this paper has focused solely on tobacco, we believe an ideational, 
network-orientated approach to examining the relationship between evidence and 
policy may have broader application.  Indeed, similar approaches have already been 
applied in studies exploring health inequalities and climate change debates (Smith 
2007; Blok 2010).  Other contemporary public health concerns arguably have even 
more in common with tobacco (e.g. Freudenberg 2005; Brownell and Warner 2009), 
although the ACF is likely to be less useful for policy issues which are not marked by 
strong oppositions.  If the approach outlined in this paper does have broader 
applicability, further research might explore how evidence and ideas shape, and are 
shaped by, coalition strategies and tactics (e.g. Cairney 2007 notes the potential 
importance of multi-level governance and ‘venue-shopping’ in explaining the 
evolution of UK tobacco policy).  More ambitiously, it might be possible to assess 
whether the characteristics of different ideas (including their relationship with 
evidence), and/or the strategies used to promote those ideas, can be categorised in 
ways which help explain why some (but not all) ideas enable policy change.   
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